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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

;

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]
Case No. 20080120

vs.

]
Dist. Court No. 071900760

DAVID DANIEL QUINT ANA,
Defendant/Appellant.

;
]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a finding of guilt by a jury for Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a first-degree felony in
violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8, and Possession of a Controlled Substance within
a Drug-Free Zone, a second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8.
The Defendant was found guilty on October 31, 2007. The Defendant was
sentenced to a term of five years which may be for life in the Utah State Prison
on the first-degree felony. He was also sentenced to a term zero to five years in
the Utah State Prison on the second-degree felony. The Defendant is currently
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AND
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A
DRUG FREE ZONE?
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under a correction of
error standard of review. This Court should use a question of law standard of
review. uWe reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as
a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State
v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore, this Court
should review the evidence "in a light most favorable to the jury verdict," State
v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and reverse the Defendant's
conviction only if "the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant committed the crime." Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (citations and
quotations omitted). Since Defendant's attorney didn't move for a directed
verdict it should be reviewed under a plain error standard of review.

u

[T]o

establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an
alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the
following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a

reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. . ." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
§58-37-8(l)(a). Prohibited acts -- Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter^ it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit
substance
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 17(P)
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of
all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser
included offense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
David Quintana was charged in the Second District Court of Weber
County with Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
first-degree felony, and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree
felony, which was enhanced to a second-degree felony because the possession
was within a drug-free zone. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts.
David Quintana is currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison and timely
filled a motion to appeal on January 23, 2008.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Weber Morgan Narcotic Strike Force ("Strike Force") set up a
controlled buy on January 27, 2006. The Strike Force was contacted by Patrick
Anderson who had previously worked as a Confidential Informant for the
Strike Force on roughly four to five other occasions. (R. 130/127) Mr.
Anderson then volunteered to work as a Confidential Informant for the Strike
Force on January 27, 2006. (R. 130/124) In previous instances, Mr. Anderson
would give information to the agents regarding buying, selling, and associating
with drug dealers and narcotics. (R. 130/125) On the date of January 27, 2006,
Mr. Anderson came to the strike force to offer some information regarding
David Quintana. (R. 130/126). Mr. Anderson then negotiated with the Strike

Force to engage in controlled buy from David and would get paid by the Strike
Force for performing controlled buys. (R. 130/127|)
On January 27, 2006 Mr. Anderson met with agents Shawn Grogan and
Juston Dickerson at a church parking lot near David Quintana's residence. (R.
130/134) At that time, Mr. Anderson was searched, given a recording device
and marked money. (R. 130/134) Mr. Anderson then headed towards David
Quintana's house with the instruction to make a buy and then leave. (R.
130/134)
Once Mr. Anderson arrived at David's hou$e, he waited outside for eight
to ten minutes. (R. 130/138) Mr. Anderson was then invited inside by David
Quintana and walked to the back of the home. (R, 130/139) Mr. Anderson then
arranged to purchase a specific quantity of methamphetamine from the
Defendant. (R. 130/141) Mr. Anderson then paid David the $200 that the
police Strike Force had provided him. (R. 130/146) David then measured out
the correct eight-ball quantity and handed it to M i Anderson. (R. 130/144) Mr.
Anderson then put the drugs in his pocket, walked out of the house, walked
around the corner, and got into the vehicle with Agent Dickerson. (R. 130/167)
At that point, Mr. Anderson gave Agent Dickerson
methamphetamine.

a baggie of

(R. 130/167) The baggie was later tested and found

positive for 3.3 grams of methamphetamine. (1^. 130/227) After giving the

baggie to Agent Dickerson, they returned to the church parking lot. (R.
130/170) The officers then paid Mr. Anderson, searched him, and then he left.
(R. 130/171)
On February 10, 2006, other officers were at David's home to arrest him
for other warrants issued. (R. 130/172) At that time, Agent Grogan took the
warrant that he had prepared to a judge to get it signed while the other officers
waited for over an hour outside of David Quintana's home. (R. 130/172) The
officers then entered the home of David Quintana and performed a search. (R.
130/174) During the search the officers

located a small baggie of

methamphetamine in the kitchen freezer. (R. 130/174) The agents then took
this baggie and placed it in evidence at the Ogden Police station. (R. 130/177)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant, David Quintana, was convicted possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a controlled
substance in a drug free zone. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that David Quintana distributed a controlled substance or that the
controlled substance found in his home during a warrant search belonged to
him. The only evidence the State offered was the testimony of a previous drug
user and convict, who acted as a confidential informant. Further, the baggie of
methamphetamine found during the search was taken to the state lab and tested

for fingerprints, and the test came back inconclusive. In addition, when the
officers entered Defendant's home, there were |wo other individuals in the
home which the baggie could have belonged Ito. The conduct that David
Quintana engaged in did not rise to the level possession or intent to distribute a
controlled substance. Since the State was unable to prove the case beyond a
reasonable doubt, this Court should reverse his conviction.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT
OF POSSESSING
A
CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AND
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A
DRUG FREE ZONE.
The due process clause "protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged." In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
In the case at bar, the State provided insufficient evidence to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court should only overturn a
conviction for insufficient evidence "when it js apparent that there is not
sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the
fact-fmder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed
the crime." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ 12, 985 P.2d 911.

The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The court's
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence
is limited." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, \ 22, 3 P.3d 192. The Utah
Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 2001 UT 58,
^f 67, 27 P.3d 1115, (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, "[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court
may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts
in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict."
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court
may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction
of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid
if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence,
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the

defendant's guilty verdict. Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443 (Utah 1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole
evidence against the defendant consisted of the f$ct that the defendant was the
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he
hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the
Court also stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that
the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in
order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, Stretched to its utmost
limits, must be sufficient to prove the defdndant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 444-445.
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63
P.3d 94 the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined
that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual.
No other evidence as to a second weapon (the firslt weapon was recovered) was
found, but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had

the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that
conviction, the Court held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had
the opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if
indeed it ever existed. Id. at ^ 18.
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence
in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an
extensive marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. It is
undisputed that an illegal substance was found in the freezer at Mr. Quintana's
home. However, once the police entered the home with a search warrant, the
officers were unable to locate any fingerprints tying Mr. Quintana to the baggie
of methamphetamine, nor were the officers able to locate any other
paraphernalia that would be necessary to distribute meth. (R. 2/28) In addition,
at the time the officers entered the home, Lisa Spencer and Jeffrey Coles were
also in the home. (R. 2/93) At no time did the officers ask these individuals if
the drugs belonged to them and at no time did David Quintana admit the baggie
in the freezer belonged to him. (R. 2/94) The officers found no scales, no large
quantities of methamphetamine or no evidence of previous distribution in the
home. Mr. Quintana cooperated with the officer and truthfully told him his

drug history. (R. 2/97) Mr. Quintana was not trying to deceive the officers, nor
was he hiding any drug.
All of this notwithstanding, the State failed to prove that it was, in fact,
Mr. Quintana's baggie in the freezer. Further, the only evidence offered to
charge Mr. Quintana with the intent to distribute charge was that of a
Confidential Informant. However, the CI, Mr. Anderson, was paid by the Strike
Force and had a previous record. Further, the testimony offered at trial, the
officers that searched the Confidential Informant had inconsistent statements.
One officer testified that Mr. Anderson had a pack of cigarettes on him at the
time of the controlled buy, one officer testified he had nothing on him, a third
testified he had a wallet. (R. 2/136) The confidential informant alone is not
sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Quintana of these drug charges. No Strike
Force agent or police officer was with the CI at the time of the controlled buy
to validate the transaction.
This evidence presented at trial is insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Quintana was associated with the charges of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of
a controlled substance in a drug free zone. For these reasons, David Quintana
respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction.

CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the David Quintana respectfully requests this Court
to reverse his conviction for possession with intent to distribute and possession
in a drug-free zone.
DATED this

day of Septembe

iNDALL WIJRICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant
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prepaid this

day of September 2008.
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EXHIBIT A

SECOND D I S T R I C T COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE,

vs .

Case

DAVID QUINTANA,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

No:

JUDGMENT,

001901946
ALFRED
August

COMMITMENT

FS

C . VAN WAGENEN
2 3 , 2000

Clerk:
vennaw
P r o s e c u t o r : WESTMORELAND, RICK T
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
D a t e of b i r t h : O c t o b e r 2 5 , 1960
Video
Tape Number:
G082300

CHARGES

1. ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/24/2000 Guilty Plea
3. TAMPER W/ WITNESS/JUROR - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/24/2000 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Case No: 001901946
Date:
Aug 23, 2000

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The defendant shall serve a term of 0 - 5 [years in the Utah State
Prison for each offense, to run concurrently.

Dated

this

it

day

of

hkW/bf

Cl/flnlvA
S^TEC^IITAH
i
COUu'TVOFWEBER / SS

DATED imJ5^
CLERK OF THE COURT

ALFRED JC. VAN WAGENEN
D i s t r i q t Court Judge

CAVCF^^L 2 ^ 1 ^ / " Z " '
1

V"

BY.

/

.•IICROFiJvl

T.--±.

1 6 6 PAGEJQ7/J

^nbL

RlCi COURT

r.PR

5 an 8 3 5 -•

__l_/..^S^LlA_^-iXN'-THE SECOND,JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE - JUDGMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

Date:

MARCH 31, 1993

vs.

Case No:

931900140

DAVID D QUINTANA,

Judge:

MICHAEL J. GLASMANN

Defendant.

Clerk:

JED

(Jail)

Reporter: JAMES N JONES

Plaintiff,

FS

4>

^

HEARING
This case is before the court for SENTENCING on the charge of
(1) ATT DIST OF C/S

(Third Degree Felony)

Appearing for the State is -WILLIAM DAINES.
present.

The defendant is

Appearing as counsel for the defendant is CHRIS L SHAW.

It is the judgment and sentence of the Court that the defendant
serve a term in the Utah State Prison of 0-5 years, suspended, upon
successful completion of a term of probation of 3 6 months with the
following conditions:
1.

The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah

State Department of Adult probation and Parole and comply strictly
with its terms and conditions.
2.

The defendant shalA violate no law, either federal, state or

municipal.
~.

The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections

.vUCRORLM ROLL

160

PAIGE 1 97-5

Case Number: 931900140 FS
and to the Court whenever required.
4.

The defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of $3 00.00, plus

a state surcharge of $255.00, for a total fine of $555.00.
5.

The defendant shall pay restitution to the Weber Morgan Strike

Force in the amount of $25.00.
6.

The defendant shall serve a term in the Weber County Jail of

30 days, or as an alternative, the 3 0 days may be served at the
Problems Actions Anonymous Group Facility.

In either situation,

incarceration shall begin on April 5, 1993, by 5:00 p.m.
7.

The defendant shall complete a drug abuse evaluation, approved

by the Adult Probation and Parole department.
The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and further
orders as it may deem necessary.
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of
the County Sheriff.
Dated this

day of

JUDGE MICHAEL J. GLASMANN

2

